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INTERPRETING BEGAY AFTER SYKES: WHY
RECKLESS OFFENSES SHOULD BE ELIGIBLE
TO QUALIFY AS VIOLENT FELONIES UNDER
THE ACCA’S RESIDUAL CLAUSE
CORNELIA J.B. GORDON†
ABSTRACT
Passed as part of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) subjects felons in possession of firearms to a strict mandatory
minimum sentence if the offenders have three prior state or federal
convictions that qualify as serious drug offenses or violent felonies. A
crime qualifies as a violent felony under the residual clause, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), if it is one of the enumerated offenses of “burglary,
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.” Current federal circuit court interpretations of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Begay v. United States and Sykes v. United
States exclude both crimes with lesser mens rea—recklessness or
negligence—and strict-liability crimes from qualifying under the
residual clause.
This Note proposes that some reckless crimes, like drive-by
shooting, would qualify if compared to their closest analogs among
the enumerated offenses for purposes of determining similarity “in
kind,” a requirement under Sykes and Begay. This proposed solution
would bring some reckless offenses within the scope of the residual
clause, allowing for increased, though narrow, targeting of the most
dangerous felons: the armed career criminals.
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INTRODUCTION
1

On October 26, 2005, B.B. stood unsuspectingly in Ezell’s
2
Chicken, a restaurant in Seattle, Washington. Hearing gunshots in
the street, she ran behind the counter and looked out the storefront
3
window. She had a clear view of the shooter, who stood beneath a
4
hazy light across the street. As B.B. watched, the shooter pointed his
gun in her direction and fired again; this time, one of the bullets
5
missed her by a foot, hitting the register next to her head. The man
who B.B. would later identify as the shooter, M.L., claimed the
shooting was gang related and that he was returning fire into a rival
6
gang’s car. Yet according to B.B., whose view of M.L. was
“unobstructed,” he was not shooting into another car as he claimed—
7
he was deliberately shooting into the building.
8
The police arrested M.L. later that night. He subsequently pled
guilty to the offense of drive-by shooting in violation of Washington
9
law. He had two prior state felony convictions: a 2004 conviction for
10
a violation of Washington’s Uniform Controlled Substances Act and
11
a 2001 conviction for attempted first-degree robbery.
M.L. was arrested again in 2012 for violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), a federal statute that prohibits convicted felons from
1. The names of the parties involved in this case have been abbreviated to protect their
privacy.
2. Certification for Determination of Probable Cause at 1, Washington v. M.L., No. 05-112131-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2005). The Certification for Determination of Probable
Cause is attached to another court document, Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty to
Felony Non-Sex Offense (STTDFG), Washington v. M.L., No. 05-1-12131-5 (Wash. Super. Ct.
Dec. 16, 2005), Docket No. 19.
3. Certification for Determination of Probable Cause, supra note 2, at 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty to Felony Non-Sex Offense (STTDFG),
supra note 2, at 1. Washington’s drive-by shooting provision states that “[a] person is guilty of
drive-by shooting when he or she recklessly discharges a firearm . . . in a manner which creates a
substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.36.045(1) (West 2009). The discharge must be “either from a motor vehicle or from the
immediate area of a motor vehicle that was used to transport the shooter or the firearm, or
both, to the scene of the discharge.” Id. If the discharge is from a moving vehicle, there is a
presumption of recklessness. Id. § 9A.36.045(2). The offense is a felony. Id. § 9A.36.045(3).
10. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013).
11. Complaint for Violation at 1, United States v. M.L., No. 12-00214 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25,
2012).
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12

possessing firearms. It is one means by which Congress has
attempted to exert control over firearm possession by criminals;
13
another is the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The ACCA
14
includes the federal equivalent of a three-strikes law, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e): under this provision, a felon in possession of a firearm with
three prior convictions for a serious drug offense or a “violent felony”
qualifies as an armed career criminal—the eponym of the statute—
15
and receives a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence.
16
M.L. is the prototypical armed career criminal, though the law
17
in its current state does not appear to consider him to be one. He
would fail to qualify as an armed career criminal under either the
18
statute or its parallel provision in the Sentencing Guidelines because
one of his three prior convictions—his 2005 conviction for drive-by
19
shooting —would not qualify as a violent felony for purposes of the

12. Id. at 2; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012) (making it unlawful for any person “who has
been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year” to “possess . . . any firearm or ammunition”).
13. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 § 1802, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
14. Three-strikes laws are a relatively common antirecidivism device. For an older, but still
relevant, discussion of three-strikes laws, see generally Erik G. Luna, Foreword, Three Strikes in
a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1 (1998).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Section 924(e)(2)(B) defines a “violent felony” as “any crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or . . . is
burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).
16. M.L. was actually charged under § 922(g)(1), not § 924(e), Complaint, supra note 11, at
6, and he pled guilty to an entirely different offense, see infra note 17. Thus, the following
analysis of M.L.’s ineligibility for armed career criminal status under § 924(e) (and the reasons
therefor) constitutes my own opinion on the matter, based on Supreme Court and federal circuit
court case law.
17. M.L. ultimately pled guilty to violating 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(h) (2006) and 5871 (2006),
which prohibit possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number. Judgment at 1, United
States v. M.L., No. 12-00177 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2013). He was sentenced to ninety months in
prison. Id. at 2.
18. The crime-of-violence provision in the Sentencing Guidelines tracks the wording in
§ 924(e), and courts use the two interchangeably. See, e.g., James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192,
206 (2007) (“[T]he Sentencing Guidelines’ career offender enhancement[’s] . . . definition of a
predicate ‘crime of violence’ closely tracks ACCA’s definition of ‘violent felony.’”). The only
significant difference is the application note accompanying the Sentencing Guidelines provision.
The application note defines crime of violence to “include[] murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of
credit, and burglary of a dwelling.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1
(2012).
19. Washington’s drive-by-shooting offense qualifies as a “crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). For a first-time
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ACCA. Washington’s drive-by-shooting statute does not “ha[ve] as
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another” as required by § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), nor is
it “burglary, arson, or extortion, [or a crime] involv[ing] use of
explosives,”
the
enumerated
qualifying
offenses
under
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Consequently, it must be analyzed under the
statute’s residual clause, which expands the statutory definition of
“violent felony” to include crimes “otherwise involv[ing] conduct that
20
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”
M.L.’s drive-by-shooting conviction would fail to qualify under
the statute’s residual clause because the federal circuit courts have
read a strict mens rea requirement into the statute. Based on the
21
Supreme Court’s decisions in Begay v. United States and Sykes v.
22
United States, such courts have held that only crimes requiring intent
or knowledge can qualify as violent felonies under the residual
23
clause. As a result, Washington’s drive-by-shooting statute would be
24
ineligible because it requires only a reckless mens rea. M.L.’s prior
conviction for the drive-by shooting would thus fail to qualify as a
violent felony, despite evidence that M.L. discharged his gun
intentionally; after all, B.B. told police that M.L. aimed the gun at the
25
storefront window and fired repeatedly. M.L. should have been
eligible for armed career criminal status based on his prior
convictions, but when M.L. was found in possession of a firearm in
2012, he was not charged under § 924(e)—instead, he was charged
26
27
under § 922(g)(1), which carries a lower sentence.

offender, the standard sentencing range for a drive-by-shooting conviction is fifteen to twenty
months. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.510, 9.94A.515 (West 2010).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
21. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
22. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011).
23. See infra Parts I.B.2, I.C.2.
24. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.045(1).
25. See Certification for Determination of Probable Cause, supra note 2, at 1.
26. Complaint for Violation, supra note 11, at 6. Complaints do not tell us, of course, why a
criminal was charged under one statute as opposed to another. A discussion of prosecutorial
discretion is beyond the scope of this Note, but it is worth noting that a number of factors were
likely considered when these charging decisions were made. It is impossible to say that M.L. was
not charged under § 924(e) solely because his drive-by-shooting conviction would have failed to
qualify as a violent felony under existing case law, though this is likely something prosecutors
considered. M.L.’s case is still useful, however, because it serves as an example of an offender
who should qualify as an armed career criminal but—for whatever reason—was not charged as
such.
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Individuals like M.L. should be subject to § 924(e)’s enhanced
penalties. For a strict mens rea requirement to bar them from
qualifying would contravene congressional intent. The ACCA was
passed in an effort “to supplement the States’ law enforcement efforts
28
against ‘career’ criminals.” Enacted as Section 1802 of the Armed
Career Criminal Act of 1984, the provision currently codified as 18
U.S.C. § 924(e) originally mandated minimum sentences of fifteen
years for felons found guilty of possessing a firearm, so long as those
29
felons had at least three prior convictions for robbery or burglary.
The statute went through two revisions. It was recodified as 18
U.S.C. § 924(e) and amended by the Firearms Owners’ Protection
30
Act in 1986, then amended five months later by the Anti-Drug
31
Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA). The bulk of the amendments, and the
only ones relevant to this Note, were made by the ADAA. The
ADAA amendments to § 924(e) “expanded the predicate offenses
triggering the sentence enhancement from ‘robbery or burglary’ to ‘a
violent felony or a serious drug offense,’” “defined the term ‘violent
32
felony’ to include ‘burglary,’” and added the residual clause.
Senator Arlen Specter’s introduction of the proposed
amendments to the House Subcommittee on Crime encapsulates the

27. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2006) (“Whoever knowingly violates subsection (a)(6),
(d), (g), (h), (i), (j), or (o) of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not
more than 10 years, or both.”), with id. § 924(e)(1) (“In the case of a person who violates section
922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section
922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on
occasions different from one another, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned
not less than fifteen years . . . .”).
28. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990).
29. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1802, 98 Stat. 2185, 2185
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012)). Congress chose robbery and burglary as the
predicate felonies for two reasons: first, because “a ‘large percentage’ of crimes of theft and
violence ‘are committed by a very small percentage of repeat offenders,’ and . . . robbery and
burglary are the crimes most frequently committed by these career criminals”; and second,
because robbery and burglary are invasive crimes that can quickly cause confrontations to
escalate into violence. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1, 3 (1984));
see also S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 4–5 (1983) (noting that “[t]he volume of burglaries is even more
dramatic than the number of robberies” and that “[t]he prevalence of robbery and burglary as
the most common violent street crimes is undeniable”).
30. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100 Stat. 449, 458–59
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)).
31. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1402, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-39 to
3207-40 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)).
32. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 582, 587.
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33

impetus behind the passage of the § 924(e) ADAA amendments.
The enhancement provision, which had been in effect for a year and a
half, “ha[d] been successful with the basic classification of robberies
and burglaries as the definition for ‘career criminal,’ [but] the time
ha[d] come to broaden that definition so that [Congress could] have a
34
greater sweep and more effective use of this important statute.” The
Supreme Court, analyzing the statute’s legislative history, noted that
“[t]he issue under consideration was uniformly referred to as
35
‘expanding’ the range of predicate offenses.”
The history behind the ADAA amendments sheds light on the
meaning of the residual clause in its current form. The amendments
were the result of a compromise between two proposed bills, H.R.
4768 and H.R. 4639, which critics referred to as “too narrow” and
36
“too broad,” respectively. The narrower bill, H.R. 4768, excluded
property crimes from the list of violent felonies, despite the fact “that
some such crimes present a serious risk of harm to persons, and that
the career offenders at whom the enhancement provision is aimed
37
often specialize in property crimes.” Critics of H.R. 4768 proposed
burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives
as potential property crimes that should be included, noting that “‘[i]t
is these crimes against property—which are inherently dangerous—
38
that we think should be considered as predicate offenses.’” The
broader bill, H.R. 4639, included felonies involving “the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
or property of another” and felonies “involv[ing] a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of another may be
39
used in the course of committing the offense.” Such an amendment
would have arguably broadened the statute to include almost all

33. See Armed Career Criminal Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 4639 and H.R. 4768 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 42–47 (1986) [hereinafter
Armed Career Criminal Legislation Hearing] (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).
34. Id. at 44.
35. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 584.
36. Id. at 584–86.
37. Id. at 584.
38. Id. at 585 (quoting Armed Career Criminal Legislation Hearing, supra note 33, at 15
(statement of Deputy Att’y Gen. James Knapp)).
39. H.R. 4639, 99th Cong. (1986); S. 2312, 99th Cong. (1986).
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felonies without targeting the most dangerous criminals—the statute’s
40
original purpose.
The central issue was whether (and which) property offenses
41
should be included as predicate felonies under the statute. The
compromise bill, H.R. 4885, “expan[ded] . . . the predicate offenses to
include serious drug trafficking offenses . . . and violent felonies,
generally,” along with crimes “that involve conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to others,” citing burglary,
arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives as
42
examples of the latter.
43
In Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court also made
“[s]ome useful observations” about Congress’s intent in passing the
44
statute. The Court first emphasized Congress’s decision to target
career offenders, explaining that Congress’s “concern was not limited
to offenders who had actually been convicted of crimes of violence
45
against persons.” In particular, the Court focused on the predicate
offense of burglary (ostensibly a crime against property), which
Congress included “because of its inherent potential for harm to
46
persons.” It is this “inherent potential for harm to persons” that has
informed and guided the Supreme Court’s ACCA jurisprudence.
Lower courts, however, have failed to implement the principles
expounded by Congress and honored by the Supreme Court. The
problem stems from two Supreme Court decisions, Begay v. United
States and Sykes v. United States, the uncertain contours of which
have left federal circuit courts divided. Begay introduced a new
standard to avoid categorizing the predicate felony at issue in that
case—driving under the influence (DUI)—as a violent felony under
the residual clause, holding that predicate felonies must be
47
sufficiently “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” to qualify. After

40. See, e.g., Taylor, 495 U.S. at 586 (“‘[I]t is important to prioritize offenses.’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Armed Career Criminal Legislation Hearing, supra note 33, at 11
(statement of Rep. William Hughes))).
41. See id. at 587 (“The other major question involved in these hearings was as to what
violent felonies involving physical force against property should be included in the definition of
‘violent’ felony.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 3 (1986)) (quotation mark omitted)).
42. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 3).
43. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
44. Id. at 587.
45. See id. at 587–88.
46. See id. at 588.
47. See infra Part I.B.1.
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Begay, circuit courts uniformly assumed that the new test excluded
crimes with lesser mens rea—reckless, negligent, or strict-liability
48
crimes—because these crimes could not be “purposeful.” Sykes
retreated from Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test,
49
focusing instead on the level of risk associated with the crime. It
stated that Begay’s test was applicable only to crimes with lesser mens
rea, which implied that some of these crimes could potentially qualify
50
as violent felonies. In the wake of the two decisions, it is unclear
whether (and how) crimes with lesser mens rea will qualify as violent
51
felonies under the residual clause.
In keeping with Congress’s intent and the Supreme Court’s
ACCA jurisprudence, this Note argues that at least some reckless
52
crimes, like drive-by shooting, should be sufficiently “purposeful,
violent, and aggressive” under Begay to qualify as violent felonies
under the residual clause after Sykes. Currently, they do not. Line
drawing in this area is difficult, but not impossible—few courts would
argue, for example, that reckless offenses like vehicular manslaughter
or strict-liability offenses like DUI should qualify as violent felonies.
Indeed, if courts are willing to recognize that some “reckless” crimes
actually require an intentional act with recklessness as to the result, it
becomes possible to create a principled distinction between crimes
that should and should not qualify under the residual clause. Crimes
that have an intentional act as an element will qualify, but crimes that
lack such an element will not.
The Court has already provided a means of making such
principled distinctions: current residual-clause doctrine already
compares specific state crimes to their closest analogs among the

48. See infra Part I.B.2.
49. See infra Part I.C.1.
50. See infra Part I.C.1. Of course, it seems counterintuitive to suggest that crimes with a
lesser mens rea could ever be purposeful, and as Justice Scalia noted in Begay, some of the
enumerated offenses have a lesser mens rea. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 152
(2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“And what is more, the Court’s posited purpose is positively
contradicted by the fact that one of the enumerated crimes—the unlawful use of explosives—
may involve merely negligent or reckless conduct.”).
51. The majority of federal circuit courts have followed Sykes in holding that Begay’s
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test applies only to crimes with a lesser mens rea. See infra
Part I.C.2. It does not appear that these courts have had occasion to decide how, exactly,
Begay’s test would apply to these crimes after Sykes. See infra Part I.C.2.
52. This Note uses drive-by shooting as an example of a crime that would qualify as a
violent felony under the proposed test. It is not the only crime that would qualify under the new
test, however. Broader application of the test is discussed in Part IV.
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enumerated offenses to determine whether the state crimes are
sufficiently risky to qualify as violent felonies. Nominally reckless
felonies could be compared to arson, an enumerated offense that
frequently contains reckless elements, to determine whether there is
sufficient intent for the crime to qualify as a violent felony. Because
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence incorporates the use of the
closest-analog test in similar areas, this solution does not require
congressional intervention, and the distinction fits squarely within the
framework established by the Supreme Court’s ACCA decisions.
Part I of this Note examines the Supreme Court’s § 924(e)
jurisprudence and describes how federal circuit courts apply existing
case law to determine whether a given predicate offense will qualify
as a violent felony under § 924(e). Part II analyzes and critiques
current scholarly approaches to the problems associated with the
residual clause. Part III attempts to reconcile the Supreme Court’s
existing case law, but in particular two of its most recent (and
arguably contradictory) decisions, Begay and Sykes, by advocating for
the inclusion of some reckless crimes under the ACCA’s residual
clause. Part IV provides examples of reckless crimes that would and
would not qualify under this Note’s proposed regime.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S § 924(E) JURISPRUDENCE
This Part will discuss existing Supreme Court case law on the
ACCA’s residual clause, focusing on two of its most recent decisions,
Begay and Sykes, and the federal circuit courts’ interpretations of
those decisions. When determining whether a felony qualifies under
the residual clause, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has
consistently focused on the risk associated with the predicate felony,
notwithstanding a slight detour from this approach in Begay. Sykes
returned the Court’s focus to the risk associated with the crime,
though it retained Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test
for lesser mens rea crimes.
The Court’s current approach to classifying crimes as violent
felonies under the residual clause involves three determinations. First,
the Court determines whether the predicate felony is a specific-intent
crime (intentional or knowing) or a crime with a lesser mens rea
(recklessness or negligence) or no mens rea at all (strict-liability
crimes). Second, the Court determines whether the predicate felony is
sufficiently risky, as measured against its closest analog among the
enumerated offenses in § 924(e). Third, for lesser mens rea and strict-
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liability crimes only, the Court determines whether the predicate
felony is sufficiently similar in kind—sufficiently “purposeful, violent,
and aggressive”—to the enumerated offenses generally. At each
stage, a categorical approach is applied to determine whether the
state statute categorically meets these requirements. An alternative
approach, the modified categorical approach, applies in limited
circumstances but is not the focus of this Note.
A. Supreme Court Case Law Prior to Begay and Sykes
Prior to its decisions in Begay and Sykes, the Supreme Court’s
§ 924(e) jurisprudence focused on the explanation and application of
the Court’s categorical and modified categorical approaches to
statutes eligible for violent-felony status. Taylor v. United States laid
the groundwork for both approaches. The Court applied the
categorical approach to the residual clause for the first time, however,
53
54
in James v. United States, using the closest-analog method.
Taylor held that courts should look beyond the title of an offense
to determine whether a crime qualifies as an enumerated offense
55
under § 924(e), an inquiry it called the categorical approach. The
categorical approach requires two separate but related inquiries.
First, a court determines the crime’s generic definition; that is, a court
must investigate how the crime is defined in the majority of state
criminal statutes. Second, after having derived such a generic
definition, a court then evaluates whether the state statute at issue—
regardless of the underlying facts that led to the conviction—is
sufficiently similar to the generic definition to merit inclusion under
§ 924(e). Specifically, the Court established this approach in Taylor to
determine whether the statutory label of, and the conviction for,
“burglary” justified sentencing under § 924(e), or whether some
56
additional inquiry was required.
53. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007).
54. See id. at 202 (employing the categorical approach to “consider whether the elements of
the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion within the residual provision, without
inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender”).
55. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588–89 (1990) (“[T]he enhancement
provision always has embodied a categorical approach to the designation of predicate
offenses. . . . Congress intended that the enhancement provision be triggered by crimes having
certain specified elements, not by crimes that happened to be labeled ‘robbery’ or ‘burglary’ by
the laws of the State of conviction.”).
56. See id. at 580 (concluding that § 924(e) was unclear on its face as to whether Congress
intended courts to employ state-law definitions of “burglary” or some uniform, generic
definition of the term).
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First, the Court in Taylor concluded that there was, in fact, a
generic definition of “burglary” against which state burglary statutes
57
could be measured. Based in part on the statute’s legislative history,
the Court determined that Congress intended courts to use modern,
“generic” definitions of crimes “roughly corresponding to the
58
definitions of [the crime] in a majority of the States’ criminal codes.”
Consequently, courts are not to use common-law definitions of
crimes, both to prevent defendants from taking advantage of
common-law technicalities and to protect defendants from the
59
potential unfairness of variable state-law labeling schemes. The use
of generic definitions also harmonizes with Congress’s prior practice
60
in this area.
Second, the Court in Taylor explained the way in which state
burglary statutes would be measured against this generic definition. It
distinguished between two approaches: the categorical approach,
which uses these generic definitions as the standard, and a modified
categorical approach, which allows for a more nuanced, fact-intensive
61
inquiry. When comparing state burglary offenses to the generic
definition of burglary, the Court held that courts should look to the
57. Prior to the ADAA amendments, § 924(e) included a definition of “burglary” that
courts had to apply for sentencing purposes under the statute, which the Court found to be
persuasive evidence that such tasks were not to be “left to the vagaries of state law.” Id. at 580,
588. The Court determined that “Congress intended that the enhancement provision be
triggered by crimes having certain specified elements, not by crimes that happened to be labeled
‘robbery’ or ‘burglary’ by the laws of the State of conviction.” Id. at 588–89.
58. Id. at 589.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 591 (noting the fit with Congress’s “general approach of using uniform
categorical definitions to identify predicate offenses”).
61. Id. at 600. The modified categorical approach is not the focus of this Note, but the
Court has described this approach and its application as follows:
When the law under which the defendant has been convicted contains statutory
phrases that cover several different generic crimes, some of which require violent
force and some of which do not, the ‘modified categorical approach’ that we have
approved permits a court to determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the
conviction by consulting the trial record—including charging documents, plea
agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, findings of fact and conclusions of law from
a bench trial, and jury instructions and verdict forms.
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 144 (2010) (citation omitted).
The Court has not explicitly applied the modified categorical approach to the residual
clause, but its case law indicates that it should apply. See id. at 145 (declining to analyze the
predicate felony under the residual clause because the argument was not preserved). Federal
circuit courts have also recognized as much. See, e.g., United States v. Chitwood, 676 F.3d 971,
976 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The second way that a crime can come within the residual clause is the
modified categorical approach, which can be applied where some, but not all, of the violations
of a particular statute will involve the requisite violence.”).
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statutory definitions of the offenses and not to the facts of the
62
underlying conviction, a method known as the categorical approach.
The Court in Taylor recognized, however, that when a state statute
criminalizes conduct more broadly than the generic offense would, a
limited inquiry into the facts of the case is allowed; this is known as
63
the modified categorical approach. Some scholars have suggested
that a broader application of the modified categorical approach could
64
solve many of the residual clause’s problems. This Note focuses on
the application of the categorical approach, however.
The categorical approach applies to the residual clause as well as
to the enumerated offenses. The Court first applied the categorical
approach to § 924(e)’s residual clause in James v. United States to
determine whether an attempted burglary qualified as a violent
65
felony under that provision. Because the residual clause implicates
crimes involving “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
66
physical injury to another,” applying the categorical approach
required the Court to determine whether the predicate felony was
67
sufficiently risky as a categorical matter. The Court looked to the
enumerated offenses as a baseline for measuring the sufficiency of the
risk of the relevant felony, asking “whether the risk posed by
attempted burglary is comparable to that posed by its closest analog
68
among the enumerated offenses,” completed burglary.
62. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.
63. The Taylor Court held:
This [modified] categorical approach, however, may permit the sentencing court to go
beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases where a jury was
actually required to find all the elements of generic burglary. For example, in a State
whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, if the
indictment or information and jury instructions show that the defendant was charged
only with a burglary of a building, and that the jury necessarily had to find an entry of
a building to convict, then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction
for enhancement.
Id. at 602.
64. See infra Part II.
65. The Court analyzed the attempted-burglary statute at issue under the residual clause
because it did “not have ‘as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another.’” James, 550 U.S. at 197 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2000 & Supp. IV)). As attempted burglary, the crime did not qualify under the
enumerated offense of burglary. Id. Thus, the Court analyzed it under the residual clause. Id.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
67. See James, 550 U.S. at 201–02 (holding that a crime qualifies under the categorical
approach when “the elements of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion
within the residual provision, without inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular
offender”).
68. Id. at 203.
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Additionally, the Court’s application in James of the categorical
approach to the residual clause helped clarify the level of risk
required. The Court held that “the proper inquiry is whether the
conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the ordinary
69
case, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another.” The
Court would next address § 924(e)’s residual clause in Begay.
B. Begay and the “Purposeful, Violent, and Aggressive” Test
The question in Begay v. United States was whether a DUI
conviction constituted a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual
70
clause, accepting the district court’s and the affirming circuit court’s
conclusion that felony DUI “presents a serious potential risk of
71
physical injury to another.” After James, to qualify as a violent
felony under the residual clause, a predicate felony had to be
72
sufficiently risky. To be sufficiently risky, a predicate felony had to
have a level of risk that was comparable to its closest analog among
73
the enumerated offenses. Begay refined the James test, explaining
that a predicate felony must be similar to its closest analog in two
74
ways: in degree of risk posed and “in kind.”
1. The Supreme Court’s Opinion in Begay. In clarifying the way
in which a predicate felony must be similar to the enumerated
offenses to qualify as a violent felony under the residual clause, Begay
75
focused on the distinct phrasing of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) in a way that
no prior Supreme Court opinion had. The Court found it significant
that the residual clause was preceded in the text of the statute by both
69. Id. at 208. The Court held that Florida’s attempted-burglary statute was sufficiently
risky and qualified as a violent felony under the residual clause. Id. at 214.
70. Larry Begay pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), after threatening his sister and aunt with a rifle. Begay v. United States, 553
U.S. 137, 140 (2008). The district court held that Begay’s three prior felony DUI convictions
under New Mexico law qualified as violent felonies under the residual clause because they
presented a serious risk of physical injury to others, United States v. Begay, 377 F. Supp. 2d
1141, 1145 (D.N.M. 2005); the Tenth Circuit affirmed, United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 977
(10th Cir. 2006), and the Supreme Court granted certiorari, United States v. Begay, 551 U.S.
1191 (2007).
71. Begay, 553 U.S. at 141.
72. James, 550 U.S. at 201–02.
73. Id. at 203.
74. Begay, 553 U.S. at 143. The “in kind” requirement is discussed at length in Part I.D.
75. Section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), which includes the residual clause, reads as follows: “[A
violent felony] is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another . . . .”
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the enumerated offenses and the word “otherwise,” reasoning that
the “otherwise” term implied that the residual clause refers to crimes
that are “similar to the listed examples in some respects but different
in others—similar, say, in respect to the degree of risk it produces, but
different in respect to the ‘way or manner’ in which it produces that
76
risk.” Qualifying crimes, the Court held, will be “roughly similar, in
77
kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves.”
First, Begay addressed the “in kind” requirement, restricting the
number of crimes that could qualify as violent felonies by requiring a
predicate felony to be “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” like its
78
closest analog among the enumerated offenses. Based on the
placement of “otherwise” in the statute’s text, the Court determined
that the enumerated offenses—burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes
involving the use of explosives—“illustrate the kinds of crimes that
79
fall within the statute’s scope.” The inclusion of the enumerated
offenses in the statute “indicates that the statute covers only similar
crimes, rather than every crime that ‘presents a serious potential risk
80
of physical injury to another.’” The enumerated offenses preceding
the residual clause thus limit the crimes that can qualify as violent
felonies under that clause to crimes that are similar to the
81
enumerated offenses. The Court then announced the means by
which lower courts should determine whether a predicate felony is
sufficiently similar. Drawing from Judge McConnell’s partial dissent
in the Tenth Circuit, the Court held that DUI “differ[ed] from the
82
example crimes . . . in at least one pertinent, and important, respect.”

76. Begay, 553 U.S. at 144 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1598 (Philip Babcok Grove ed.,
1961)).
77. Id. at 143.
78. Begay did not explicitly refer to the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” inquiry as the
“in kind” requirement, though it implied as much, as the discussion in this Section suggests.
Federal circuit courts have explicitly recognized this inquiry as the “in kind” requirement. See,
e.g., United States v. Chitwood, 676 F.3d 971, 977 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]o be similar in kind to
those listed crimes—burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of explosives—offenses that were
violent crimes under the residual provision must also involve ‘purposeful, violent, and
aggressive conduct.’” (emphasis added)).
79. Begay, 553 U.S. at 142 (emphasis added).
80. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2000)).
81. Id. at 143.
82. Id. at 144.
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Unlike the enumerated offenses, it did not “typically involve
83
purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct.”
The Court explained the reasoning behind this new test, focusing
on the “purposeful” component. Although the Court did not indicate
that one aspect of the test was to be given greater weight than any
84
other, the cases it cited in support of its new test all emphasized the
85
intentional nature of the enumerated offenses. The Court justified
the Begay test generally and the purposeful component in particular
when it reasoned that an offender’s prior “purposeful, violent, and
aggressive” conduct “makes [it] more likely that an offender, later
86
possessing a gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a victim.”
Additionally, “[c]rimes committed in such a purposeful, violent, and
aggressive manner are ‘potentially more dangerous when firearms are
87
involved.’” It is these crimes, the Court explained, that “are
‘characteristic of the armed career criminal, the eponym of the
88
statute.’”
The Court held that the DUI statute at issue in Begay was too
dissimilar to the enumerated offenses to qualify under the residual
clause. It analogized DUI statutes to strict-liability crimes that do not

83. Id. at 144–45 (citing United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 980 (10th Cir. 2006)
(McConnell, J., dissenting in part)). The Court later admitted in Sykes that “[t]he phrase
‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive’ has no precise textual link to the residual clause,” and it “is
an addition to the statutory text.” Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2275 (2011).
84. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 144–45 (“In our view, DUI differs from the example crimes—
burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives—in at least one pertinent,
and important, respect. The listed crimes all typically involve purposeful, ‘violent,’ and
‘aggressive’ conduct.” (quoting Begay, 470 F.3d at 980 (McConnell, J., dissenting in part))).
85. Begay cited Taylor’s definition of “burglary” as “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into
a building or other structure with ‘intent to commit a crime,’” id. at 145 (emphasis added)
(quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)); the Model Penal Code’s (MPC’s)
definition of “arson” as “causing a fire or explosion with ‘the purpose of,’ e. g., ‘destroying a
building . . . of another’ or ‘damaging any property . . . to collect insurance,’” id. (alteration in
original) (first emphasis added) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) (1985)); and the
MPC’s definition of “extortion” as “‘purposely’ obtaining property of another through threat of,
e. g., inflicting ‘bodily injury,’” id. (emphasis added) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4);
along with the Court’s analysis of “use” in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), in which it
noted that “‘use’ . . . most naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely
accidental conduct’ which fact helps bring it outside the scope of the statutory term ‘crime of
violence,’” Begay, 553 U.S. at 145 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Leocal, 543
U.S. at 9). Each of the examples cited by the Court specifically mentions “intent” or “purpose,”
whereas violence and aggression are at best implied in the cited examples.
86. Begay, 553 U.S. at 145 (emphasis added).
87. Id. (quoting Begay, 470 F.3d at 980 (McConnell, J., dissenting in part)).
88. Id. (quoting Begay, 470 F.3d at 980 (McConnell, J., dissenting in part)).
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require criminal intent. To be convicted of a DUI, a driver’s conduct
need not be purposeful, the Court noted, because DUI offenses only
90
involve negligent or accidental conduct. For purposes of the ACCA,
the Court held, the defendant’s past criminal conduct must reveal
more than a simple disregard for risk: it needs to demonstrate “an
increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who might
91
deliberately point the gun and pull the trigger.”
The Court attempted to provide guidance to the lower courts
with examples, though its opinion left the law with uncertain
contours. It cited a host of crimes that it believed would be covered,
contrary to Congress’s intent, if § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) were read without
the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” requirement, including
92
crimes with a reckless or negligent mens rea. Despite its reference to
the crimes with a mens rea of negligence or recklessness, however,
the Court limited its decision to the crime at issue in Begay:
Rather, we hold only that, for purposes of the particular statutory
provision before us, a prior record of DUI, a strict-liability crime,
differs from a prior record of violent and aggressive crimes
committed intentionally such as arson, burglary, extortion, or crimes
involving the use of explosives. The latter are associated with a
likelihood of future violent, aggressive, and purposeful “armed
93
career criminal” behavior in a way that the former are not.

The lower courts were thus left to apply this new test to
determine whether predicate offenses qualified as violent felonies
under the residual clause.
2. The Circuit Courts’ Interpretation of Begay. By limiting its
holding to the particular facts at issue in Begay, the Supreme Court
provided little guidance for the lower courts left to interpret the new
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test. A standard nonetheless
emerged at the circuit level. Circuit court opinions post-Begay
focused on the purposeful aspect of the test and on whether crimes
with a reckless or negligent mens rea could qualify as violent felonies
89. Id.
90. See id. (“[W]e agree with the Government that a drunk driver may very well drink on
purpose. But this Court has said that, unlike the example crimes, the conduct for which the
drunk driver is convicted (driving under the influence) need not be purposeful or deliberate.”).
91. Id. at 146.
92. See id. (mentioning reckless pollution, negligent pollution, negligent seamanship, and
reckless tampering with consumer products as examples).
93. Id. at 148.
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after Begay. Despite Begay’s lack of guidance, the lower courts’
reactions were remarkably consistent. Every circuit court to address
the issue held that Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test
categorically excludes strict-liability crimes and crimes with a mens
94
rea of recklessness or negligence. This is not to say, however, that
95
courts have been eager to accept this state of affairs.
For example, crimes with an extremely reckless mens rea may
still qualify as violent felonies in the Sixth Circuit after Begay. In

94. As the Eighth Circuit noted in United States v. Ossana, 638 F.3d 895, (8th Cir. 2011),
“The parties have cited, and we have identified, no circuit-level cases post Begay in which a
court found an offense qualified as a violent felony or crime of violence where the mens rea for
the offense was mere recklessness and where there were no further qualifications to suggest
purposeful, violent, or aggressive conduct.” Id. at 901. A survey of the case law bears out
Ossana’s assertion. See United States v. Jenkins, 631 F.3d 680, 685 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[U]nder
Begay and Chambers, the Resisting Arrest Offense is not a ‘crime of violence’ for purposes of
the Career Offender Enhancement only if it can be committed either negligently or
recklessly . . . .”); United States v. Holloway, 630 F.3d 252, 261 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Reckless battery
does not typically involve purposeful conduct and thus is not similar in kind to the offenses
enumerated within § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).”); United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 196 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“[F]ollowing Begay, a conviction for mere recklessness cannot constitute a crime of violence.”);
United States v. Coronado, 603 F.3d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[C]rimes with a mens rea of gross
negligence or recklessness do not satisfy Begay’s requirement of ‘purposeful’ conduct.”); United
States v. Hughes, 602 F.3d 669, 677 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Unlike failure to report, escape is typically
committed in a purposeful manner, and when these escapes cause injuries, those injuries
typically result from intentional action, not negligence or even recklessness.”); United States v.
McFalls, 592 F.3d 707, 716 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A] crime requiring only recklessness does not
qualify.”); United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1334–35 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Begay test
specifically requires that the crime in question ‘typically’ involve purposeful conduct.”); United
States v. Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]hose crimes with a mens rea of negligence
or recklessness do not trigger the enhanced penalties mandated by the ACCA.”); United States
v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Despite coming close to crossing the threshold into
purposeful conduct, the criminal acts defined by the reckless endangerment statute are not
intentional, a distinction stressed by the Supreme Court in Begay.”). The Eleventh Circuit has
not explicitly addressed this issue.
95. For example, Covarrubias Teposte v. Holder, 632 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2010), involved a
similar repeat-offender provision in the immigration context, which included in its definition of
a crime of violence “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the
course of committing the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2006). Though the court held that
shooting at an inhabited dwelling or vehicle was not a “crime of violence” under § 16(b), it did
so reluctantly. Covarrubias Teposte, 632 F.3d at 1055–56. As the court explained,
Shooting a gun in the direction of another person seems like a paradigm of violent
action. . . . But our en banc precedent . . . stands in the way of a doctrinal
development that would acknowledge the common sense view that shooting at an
inhabited structure, whether intentionally or recklessly, is a crime of violence
warranting removal under the immigration laws.
Id. at 1056 n.2.
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United States v. Meeks, the Sixth Circuit justified its designation of a
wanton-endangerment crime as a violent felony on the grounds that
“wanton endangerment involves criminal intent (being aware of and
97
consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk).”
Though Meeks’s conviction did not require an intent to cause injury,
the Sixth Circuit found that it was still “purposeful, violent, and
aggressive,” because Meeks was aware that there was a substantial
risk that injury would result from his conduct, and he disregarded that
98
risk. Nevertheless, after Begay, the circuit court consensus was that
crimes with a reckless or negligent mens rea and strict-liability crimes
should not qualify as violent felonies under § 924(e).
C. Sykes and Its Qualification of Begay
Sykes limited Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test
to strict-liability crimes and crimes with a mens rea of recklessness or
99
negligence. In Sykes, the Supreme Court faced the inevitable result
of its decision in Begay: the conviction at issue (felony vehicular
flight) was a crime that was not “purposeful, violent, and aggressive”
on its face, yet it involved inherently criminal conduct and a high
100
potential for serious physical injury. The question in Sykes was
96. United States v. Meeks, 664 F.3d 1067 (6th Cir. 2012). Meeks was decided post-Sykes,
but the court noted that its decision was merited regardless of whether the test from Begay or
Sykes was used. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
97. Meeks, 664 F.3d at 1070–71. In light of courts’ reluctance to bar reckless crimes entirely,
see supra note 94, it is perhaps significant that the definition the Court used in Meeks of the
criminal intent required for wanton endangerment sounds very similar to the definition for the
mens rea of recklessness, see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985) (“A person acts
recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct.”).
98. Meeks, 664 F.3d at 1072. The Sixth Circuit found that after Sykes, it no longer needed
to apply Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test, but noted that the inclusion of
wanton endangerment as a violent felony was merited based solely on the application of the
Begay test, as well. See id. (“[W]hether we apply a categorical risk analysis in light of Sykes, or a
modified-categorical approach using the two-step Begay inquiry, we are satisfied that Meeks’s
prior convictions for first degree wanton endangerment were crimes of violence, and that he was
properly sentenced as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.”).
99. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2275–76 (2011).
100. The Court described the facts of Sykes’s felony vehicular-flight conviction as follows:
After observing Sykes driving without using needed headlights, police activated their
emergency equipment for a traffic stop. Sykes did not stop. A chase ensued. Sykes
wove through traffic, drove on the wrong side of the road and through yards
containing bystanders, passed through a fence, and struck the rear of a house. Then
he fled on foot. He was found only with the aid of a police dog.
Id. at 2272.
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whether an Indiana statute criminalizing knowing or intentional
101
vehicular flight from law enforcement qualifies as a violent felony.
The Court analyzed the Indiana statute under the residual clause
because it did not require as an element the use or the threatened use
of physical force against a person under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), nor was it
102
an enumerated offense under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). To resolve the
issue, the Court qualified the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive”
test it used in Begay, apparently limiting that test to crimes with a
lesser mens rea and emphasizing instead the risk-based approach it
had utilized prior to its decision in Begay.
1. The Supreme Court’s Opinion in Sykes. Sykes provided an
important gloss on Begay, limiting the application of that decision and
its “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test to strict-liability crimes
103
and crimes with a mens rea of recklessness or negligence. In its
analysis, the Supreme Court in Sykes rejected an application of Begay
104
to the statute at issue. The defendant argued that Indiana’s felony
vehicular-flight statute did not involve “purposeful, violent, and
105
aggressive” conduct as required by Begay. The Court disagreed,
finding that “Sykes, in taking this position, overreads the opinions of
106
this Court.” Begay was “[t]he sole decision of this Court concerning
the reach of ACCA’s residual clause in which risk was not the
107
108
dispositive factor.” The difference was in the mens rea. Unlike
other crimes the Court had considered under the ACCA, the DUI
statute at issue in Begay did not involve “a stringent mens rea
109
110
requirement,” though the Indiana statute at issue in Sykes did.
Because the statute at issue in Sykes had a stricter mens rea
requirement, the Court declined to apply the Begay test to Sykes.
Instead, it found that the risk levels were sufficient to resolve the
101. Id. at 2270. Sykes’s previous conviction for fleeing law-enforcement officers was a class
D felony because he “use[d] a vehicle to commit the offense.” Id. at 2271 (citing IND. CODE
§ 35-44-3-3 (2004) (repealed 2012)).
102. Id. at 2273.
103. Id. at 2275–76.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2275.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. “Violators [of the Indiana statute] must act ‘knowingly or intentionally.’” Id. (citing
IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(a) (2004) (repealed 2012)).
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case. In fact, the Court reasoned, “Begay involved a crime akin to
strict liability, negligence, and recklessness crimes; and the
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” formulation was used in that
112
case to explain the result.” The Court acknowledged the difficulties
113
inherent in a risk-based approach, but found it significant that
Congress “stated a normative principle,” rather than simply listing
114
qualifying offenses in the statute.
This normative principle revolved around risk, and it was on that
ground that the Court resolved the issue in Sykes. Congress, the
Court explained, intended for crimes to qualify under the residual
clause when they involved a potential risk of injury similar to that of
115
the enumerated offenses. Based on the normative principle that the
Court elucidated, it determined that Sykes’s conviction for felonious
116
vehicular flight was a violent felony. It is only in cases in which the
mens rea of the predicate felony is less than intentional or knowing
117
that Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test applies.
2. Circuit Court Decisions After Sykes. Post-Sykes, circuit courts
have split as to whether Begay applies to strict-liability crimes and
crimes with a mens rea of recklessness or negligence. The majority of
circuit courts have determined that the “purposeful, violent, and
aggressive” test from Begay applies only to crimes of strict liability,
negligence, and recklessness, and that otherwise, the level of risk
alone is sufficient to determine whether the crime in question

111. Id. at 2275–76 (“As between the two inquiries, risk levels provide a categorical and
manageable standard that suffices to resolve the case before us.”).
112. Id. at 2276. The idea that strict-liability crimes and crimes with a mens rea of
recklessness or negligence can be “purposeful” seems counterintuitive. Nor is this concept
totally consistent with the closest-analog approach. As Justice Scalia pointed out in Begay, some
of the enumerated offenses have a lesser mens rea. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 152
(2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“And what is more, the Court’s posited purpose is positively
contradicted by the fact that one of the enumerated crimes—the unlawful use of explosives—
may involve merely negligent or reckless conduct.”).
113. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2277 (“ACCA ‘requires judges to make sometimes difficult
evaluations of the risks posed by different offenses.’” (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S.
192, 210 n.6 (2007))).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 2276 (holding that unlike the DUI statute in Begay, “[t]he felony at issue here
is not a strict liability, negligence, or recklessness crime and because it is, for the reasons stated
and as a categorical matter, similar in risk to the listed crimes,” it qualifies as a violent felony
under the residual clause).
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118

qualifies as a violent felony. Only one of the circuits in the majority,
the Seventh Circuit, has addressed how to apply Begay’s test to
crimes with a lesser mens rea. The Seventh Circuit seemed to imply in
dicta that none of these lesser mens rea crimes could ever qualify as
violent felonies under the residual clause, which was what many
courts assumed post-Begay but pre-Sykes, though this approach
119
seems to conflict with the Court’s decision in Sykes.
Not all circuit courts have adopted this understanding of Sykes,
however. A minority of circuit courts have continued to apply Begay’s
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test to crimes with an
120
intentional or knowing mens rea, even though the Supreme Court’s
121
opinion in Sykes seems to preclude this possibility.
D. Applying § 924(e) to Predicate Felonies Under the Residual Clause
This Section discusses the current approach used to determine
whether predicate felonies are violent felonies for purposes of

118. The First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits form the
majority. See United States v. Spencer, 724 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Miller, 721 F.3d 435, 438–39 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Evans, 699 F.3d 858, 865 (11th Cir.
2012); Harrington v. United States, 689 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Lillard, 685
F.3d 773, 776 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Grupee, 682 F.3d 143, 149 (1st Cir. 2012); United
States v. Jones, 673 F.3d 497, 506 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Smith, 652 F.3d 1244, 1248
(10th Cir. 2011).
119. The Seventh Circuit appeared to treat Sykes’s gloss on Begay, see supra Part I.C.1, as a
mere explanation, stating that “[t]he concerns discussed in Begay—that the crime be
‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive’—are not present here because, as explained in Sykes, those
terms simply explained why a crime akin to strict liability, negligence, or recklessness crimes
does not fit within the residual clause.” Miller, 721 F.3d at 439. This does not seem compatible
with Sykes, which stated that “[i]n many cases the purposeful, violent, and aggressive inquiry
will be redundant with the inquiry into risk, for crimes that fall within the former formulation
and those that present serious potential risks of physical injury to others tend to be one and the
same.” Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275 (emphasis added). If the inquiry is redundant in “many” cases,
it implies that it will not be redundant in all cases, as Miller seems to suggest. The Seventh
Circuit’s opinion was not totally clear, however, because it proceeded to say that it did not
“have to go through Begay’s ‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive’ analysis” because the crime
required knowledge. Miller, 721 F.3d at 439.
120. The Third and Fourth Circuits form the minority. See United States v. Johnson, 675
F.3d 1013, 1019 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 780–81 (4th Cir. 2011). The
Fifth Circuit has not come to a definitive answer.
121. As discussed above, the Court in Sykes stated that when
[t]he felony at issue . . . is not a strict liability, negligence, or recklessness crime and
[when] it is, for the reasons stated and as a categorical matter, similar in risk to the
listed crimes, it is a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.”
Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2276 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)). It thus declined to apply
Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test.

GORDON IN PRINTER PROOF CLEAN VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

12/3/2013 3:48 PM

976

[Vol. 63:955

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

§ 924(e), based on Supreme Court precedent and the majority
approach employed by the circuit courts. After a predicate offense
122
satisfies the felony requirement, a court must decide whether the
offense should be analyzed under the residual clause. Assuming that
123
the residual clause applies, a court must then determine which of
the enumerated offenses is the potential predicate felony’s closest
analog and whether, as a categorical matter, the potential predicate
felony is similar in the degree of risk posed to that of its closest analog
among the enumerated offenses. If the crime has a reckless or
negligent mens rea, or is a strict-liability crime, a court must also
determine whether it is similar in kind to the enumerated offenses,
generally—that is, whether it is sufficiently “purposeful, violent, and
aggressive.”
When determining whether a crime is sufficiently similar in terms
of risk to the enumerated offenses of burglary, arson, extortion, and
crimes involving the use of explosives, it must be compared to its
124
closest analog among those offenses. Though the Supreme Court
has not clearly articulated how lower courts should select the closest
analog from among the enumerated offenses, the Court has
considered the defendant’s mens rea and the way in which the
potential risk of injury is created. For example, Sykes compared the
125
predicate felony—vehicular flight—to both arson and burglary.
Comparing felonious vehicular flight to arson, the Court noted that
the mens rea of a criminal who flees and consequently creates a
substantial risk of injury was similar to that of a criminal who engages
“in arson, which also entails intentional release of a destructive force
126
dangerous to others.” When comparing felonious vehicular flight to
burglary, the Court emphasized the way in which the risk was created:
burglary and vehicular flight are similarly dangerous because each

122. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘violent felony’ means any crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . .”).
123. The residual clause applies when a predicate felony does not “ha[ve] as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” as
required by § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), and is not “burglary, arson, or extortion, [or a crime] involv[ing]
use of explosives,” the enumerated qualifying offenses under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
124. The Supreme Court has justified the closest-analog test on the grounds that “[t]he
specific offenses enumerated in clause (ii) provide one baseline from which to measure whether
other similar conduct ‘otherwise . . . presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.’” James
v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2000 & Supp.
IV)).
125. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2273.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
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can end in confrontation, and like burglary, vehicular flight endangers
127
both property and persons.
Once a court has determined which enumerated offense is the
closest analog to the crime in question, it must determine whether the
crime is “roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed,”
to the analog offense (to evaluate similarity in risk) and to the
enumerated offenses generally (to evaluate similarity in kind),
128
applying the categorical approach to both inquiries. Under the
categorical approach, “[a] trial court [must] look only to the fact of
129
conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.” It may
130
not look to the facts underlying the conviction. Instead, a court must
determine “whether the elements of the offense are of the type that
would justify its inclusion . . . without inquiring into the specific
131
conduct of this particular offender.” A court is not prohibited,
however, from looking beyond the statutory text when interpreting
the law; a court may consider authoritative state-court interpretation
132
of the relevant state statute.
First, a court must determine that the predicate offense is
133
sufficiently similar in terms of the degree of risk posed. When
applying the categorical approach to measure the risk associated with
the crime at issue, the question is “whether the conduct encompassed
by the elements of the offense, in the ordinary case, presents a serious
134
potential risk of injury to another.” The degree of risk posed by the

127. Id. at 2273–74.
128. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008).
129. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).
130. Id. However, when the relevant state statute uses statutory language encompassing
several different qualifying generic offenses under § 924(e), courts may apply the modified
categorical approach, discussed briefly above. See supra note 61.
131. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2006).
132. See id. at 202–03 (applying the categorical approach to state courts’ interpretations of
an attempted-burglary statute).
133. Begay, 553 U.S. at 143. Begay listed the “in kind” requirement first. However, the
Court’s subsequent case law has placed a much greater weight on the “degree of risk”
requirement. Because Sykes implicitly recognized that the inquiry into risk is the primary
inquiry and should be addressed first, this Note addresses it first as well. See Sykes v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2275 (2011) (noting that the Begay test is an addition, and “[i]n many
cases the purposeful, violent, and aggressive inquiry will be redundant with the inquiry into
risk”).
134. James, 550 U.S. at 208 (emphasis added). As the Court noted, “One can always
hypothesize unusual cases in which even a prototypically violent crime might not present a
genuine risk of injury . . . [b]ut that does not mean that the offenses of attempted murder or
extortion are categorically nonviolent.” Id. (emphasis added).
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crime in question must be “comparable to that posed by its closest
135
analog among the enumerated offenses”; that is, the crime must be
136
as risky as or riskier than its analog. A court may use statistical
evidence presented by the parties to determine whether the degree of
137
risk posed is sufficiently similar. A court is not required to use
138
statistics in reaching a conclusion, however.
Second, the crime must be sufficiently similar in kind to the
139
enumerated offenses generally. Prior to Sykes, courts applied
Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test to determine
whether the predicate offense was sufficiently similar in kind to the
140
enumerated offenses. It is unclear after Sykes whether the “in kind”
requirement applies to all potential predicate felonies, or only those
with a mens rea of recklessness or negligence, or strict-liability crimes,
141
though the Court seemed to say as much and this is the majority
142
practice. Some circuit courts, however, have continued to apply the
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test to crimes with a mens rea of
143
intent or knowledge even after Sykes.
Thus, the majority of circuit courts will hold that an intentional
or knowing crime qualifies under the residual clause if it is roughly

135. Id. at 203. Begay used slightly different language—“roughly similar” instead of
“comparable”—but the test appears to be the same. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 143.
136. See, e.g., Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274 (“Risk of violence is inherent to vehicle flight.
Between the confrontations that initiate and terminate the incident, the intervening pursuit
creates high risks of crashes. It presents more certain risk as a categorical matter than
burglary.”).
137. See, e.g., id. (“Although statistics are not dispositive, here they confirm the
commonsense conclusion that Indiana’s vehicular flight crime is a violent felony. . . . [C]haserelated crashes kill more than 100 nonsuspects every year. Injury rates are much higher. Studies
show that between 18% and 41% of chases involve crashes, which always carry a risk of injury,
and that between 4% and 17% of all chases end in injury.” (citation omitted)).
138. See, e.g., James, 550 U.S. at 204 (reasoning without using statistical evidence that
attempted burglary may be even riskier than burglary, because it implies an attempt thwarted
by confrontation).
139. Begay, 553 U.S. at 143. Though the inquiry into risk compares the crime in question to
its closest analog among the enumerated offenses, the “in kind” inquiry compares the crime in
question to the enumerated offenses generally. See id. at 144–45 (“In our view, DUI differs from
the example crimes—burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives—in
at least one pertinent, and important, respect. The listed crimes all typically involve purposeful,
‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct.” (quoting United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 980 (10th
Cir. 2006) (McConnell, J., dissenting in part))).
140. See id. at 144–45.
141. See supra Part I.C.
142. See supra note 118.
143. See supra note 120.
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similar in the degree of risk posed. The minority will require that the
crime be roughly similar in kind as well. If an intentional or knowing
crime meets both criteria, then, it will certainly qualify as a violent
felony under the residual clause of § 924(e). It is unclear how, or
whether, crimes with a mens rea of recklessness or negligence, or
144
strict-liability crimes, would qualify.
II. CURRENT SCHOLARLY APPROACHES TO THE RESIDUAL CLAUSE
AND THEIR DEFICIENCIES
A number of articles have proposed solutions to the problems
145
created by the ACCA—particularly by the residual clause. These
articles fall generally into four categories: (1) scholarship that
advocates congressional action—amendment—as the solution to the
problems posed by the residual clause; (2) scholarship that would
hold the residual clause void for vagueness or otherwise abolish it;
(3) scholarship suggesting novel interpretations of the statute; and
(4) scholarship suggesting novel interpretations or applications of
existing case law as a solution to the problem. Each of the proposed
solutions, however, relies on action by a third party (either the Court
or Congress) and is thus of limited use to lower courts applying Sykes
and Begay on the ground.
First, some scholars advocate congressional amendment as a
solution to the problems posed by § 924(e)’s residual clause. This
amendment scholarship stresses the need for uniformity among the
circuits, arguing that without reliable application of the ACCA across
jurisdictions, Congress’s intent in passing the statute will be

144. For an example of one court’s attempt to address this issue, see supra note 119 and
accompanying text.
145. These perceived problems are varied. Some authors believe that the residual clause is
overinclusive, see, e.g., Brett T. Runyon, Comment, ACCA Residual Clause: Strike Four? The
Court’s Missed Opportunity To Create a Workable Residual Clause Violent Felony Test, 51
WASHBURN L.J. 447, 448 (2012) (arguing for adding an additional requirement that all residual
clause violent felonies must be property crimes, which would necessarily decrease the number of
qualifying crimes), underinclusive, see, e.g., Jeffrey C. Bright, Violent Felonies Under the
Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act: Whether Carrying a Concealed Handgun
Without a Permit Should Be Considered a Violent Felony, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 601, 603 (2010)
(arguing that illegally carrying a concealed handgun should be a violent felony under the
ACCA), or both, see, e.g., James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 538 (2009)
(arguing that the ACCA is “both overinclusive and underinclusive”).
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frustrated. Some scholars suggest congressional amendments that
147
would add to the enumerated offenses. In other instances, the
amendment recommended is simply an adoption of the crime-of148
violence application note, which lists specific offenses that would
qualify as crimes of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines
149
provision. Others suggest an amendment that would qualify crimes
as violent felonies or serious drug offenses based on the length of the
sentence actually imposed, as opposed to the maximum possible
150
sentence.
Congress has had numerous opportunities to amend the ACCA,
151
yet has declined to substantively amend the residual clause. It seems
unlikely that Congress will intercede and resolve the debate any time
soon. Scholarly articles and commentaries that suggest amendment as
a solution ignore the practical reality: that Congress is unlikely to
amend the ACCA in the near future. Although interesting in theory,
these proposals do not provide guidance for lower courts and
attorneys trying to apply the residual clause as it stands.
Second, a number of commentators believe that the residual
clause should be held void for vagueness and the provision
152
abolished. Justice Scalia said as much in his dissenting opinion in
146. Bright, supra note 145, at 633 (“Without an amendment to the ACCA, different states’
arbitrary punishment of a crime will result in different outcomes under the ACCA.”).
147. See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Supreme Court and the Regulation of Risk in Criminal
Law Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 171, 219 (2012) (“Congress could list additional crimes that
per se qualify as predicate crimes.”); see also Bright, supra note 145, at 635 (proposing an
amendment to the violent-felony definition that would add “a special exception for concealed
handgun statutes in that they need not be punishable by a term exceeding one year”).
148. For a discussion of the application note, see supra note 18.
149. See Nash, supra note 147, at 218–19 (“One might consider simply having Congress
implement the ACCA as part of (or at least similarly to) the Sentencing Guidelines and
delegate to the Sentencing Commission responsibility for defining the relevant parameters.”);
see also Levine, supra note 145, at 567 (“The Sentencing Guidelines provide an excellent model
upon which to base [ACCA] reforms, because the Guidelines are promulgated and updated by
an expert congressionally-appointed commission statutorily bound to promote the purposes of
sentencing that Congress has set forth . . . .”). The application note to the Sentencing Guidelines
is discussed above. See supra note 18.
150. Ethan Davis, Comment, The Sentence Imposed Versus the Statutory Maximum:
Repairing the Armed Career Criminal Act, 118 YALE L.J. 369, 370 (2008).
151. This could be due to congressional inertia, or it could simply reflect Congress’s tacit
approval of the Court’s ACCA jurisprudence up to this point. Whatever the reason,
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) has remained essentially unchanged since the ADAA amendments. See supra
notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Hayley A. Montgomery, Comment, Remedying the Armed Career Criminal
Act’s Ailing Residual Provision, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 715, 736 (2010) (noting, as one of a
number of possibilities, that “the Court could acknowledge the statute as constitutionally
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153

Sykes. Yet, as the Sykes majority noted, the residual clause states an
intelligible principle and, though it may be difficult to apply, “it is
154
within congressional power to enact.” Given the ramifications of
invalidation and the Court’s express reluctance to do so in Sykes, it
seems unlikely that the Court will take such drastic action. Whether
or not it does, such a “solution” still relies on the Court to act.
Third, some commentators have suggested a novel interpretation
of the statute itself as an answer to the problems posed by the
residual clause. One student note focuses on the “felony” component
155
of § 924(e), which requires that a predicate felony be a “crime
156
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” It
argues that application of the ACCA (including the residual clause)
would become more consistent if courts used a uniform standard for
the felony component of § 924(e), “discount[ing] any sentencing
157
enhancements previously applied to prior convictions.” The Court’s
jurisprudence has ignored the felony element of the provision
entirely, however, making lower courts less likely to implement such a
solution.
Finally, the majority of the scholarly work addressing the
ACCA’s residual provision requires dramatic intervention on behalf
of the Court through novel interpretations of the statute or existing
case law. At least two scholars would require that crimes falling under
158
the residual clause be property crimes like the enumerated offenses.
unintelligible and hold it void for vagueness”); Mark Morgan, Note, Rising from the Ashes, but
Not High Enough: Sykes’ Clear-but-Failed Remedy for the Vague Residual Clause of the
Armed Career Criminal Act 24 (Dec. 31, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2010105 (“The clarity provided in Sykes does not change the ambiguity
and vagueness inherent in the language of the residual clause, which is why the best solution for
the clause is announcing it invalid for vagueness.”).
153. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2284 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia has grown increasingly frustrated with the Court’s attempts to clarify the “Delphic
residual clause,” and in Sykes he declared that “[w]e should admit that ACCA’s residual
provision is a drafting failure and declare it void for vagueness.” Id. Justice Scalia elaborated on
how to fix this constitutional defect, stating that “I do not think it would be a radical step—
indeed, I think it would be highly responsible—to limit ACCA to the named violent crimes.
Congress can quickly add what it wishes.” Id. at 2288.
154. Id. at 2277 (majority opinion).
155. See generally Krystle Lamprecht, Comment, Formal, Categorical, but Incomplete: The
Need for a New Standard in Evaluating Prior Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act,
98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1407 (2008).
156. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012).
157. Lamprecht, supra note 155, at 1409.
158. See Runyon, supra note 145, at 448 (“The Court [in Sykes] should have also added the
requirement that all residual clause violent felonies must be property crimes like the four
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After Sykes that position is in conflict with the Court’s case law,
159
because felonious vehicular flight is not a property crime. Other
approaches would alter the parameters of the modified categorical
160
161
approach by either expanding or contracting its scope. Expanding
the scope of the modified categorical approach, which requires a
162
limited inquiry into the facts of a case, would place a heavy burden
on judges—the Court itself has said that “the practical difficulties and
163
potential unfairness of a factual approach are daunting” —and
increase the subjectivity of the process with all that entails for
164
defendants, both good and bad. The latter would make it difficult, if

enumerated felonies that immediately precede the residual clause.”); Thomas O. Powell, The
Armed Career Criminal Act—Proposing a New Test To Resolve Difficulties in Applying the
Act’s Ambiguous Residual Clause 5 (March 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://works.bepress.com/thomas_powell/1 (advocating a three-part test requiring that “(1) [t]he
crime must be generally accepted as a crime against property[;] (2) [t]he crime must not have
been committed recklessly or negligently; and (3) [t]he crime must have made physical
confrontation with someone other than a police officer reasonably foreseeable”).
159. The Indiana resisting-arrest statute at issue in Sykes did not address property damage,
see IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3 (2004) (repealed 2012), yet the Court found that Sykes’s felonious
vehicular flight qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause anyway. Sykes,
131 S. Ct. at 2277.
160. See Amanda J. Schackart, Comment, Finding Intent Without Mens Rea: A Modified
Categorical Approach to Sentencing Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 5 SEVENTH
CIRCUIT REV. 71, 95 (2009) (“[J]udges should be allowed more discretion to look at the record
and determine whether the conduct at issue demonstrates that the defendant intended to act in
a violent and aggressive manner.”).
161. See David C. Holman, Violent Crimes and Known Associates: The Residual Clause of
the Armed Career Criminal Act, 43 CONN. L. REV. 209, 215 (2010) (arguing, in part, that “courts
should strictly follow the categorical approach and apply the residual clause to only those crimes
with elements that require the underlying conduct be violent while excluding those crimes with
elements that do not require violence or any mens rea”).
162. See supra note 61.
163. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990).
164. Consider M.L.’s case. One commentator argues that courts should have more
discretion to consult the record. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. Imagine if a court
were allowed to consult M.L.’s Certification for Determination of Probable Cause, or if M.L.’s
drive-by-shooting charge were to go to trial and the information were elicited there. If a court
were to try to incorporate the information contained in that document into its analysis, it would
raise a number of complex questions that the court would be forced to answer to properly
sentence M.L. For example, would it help or hurt M.L.’s case that he fired from the street, as
opposed to being in a vehicle? See Certification for Determination of Probable Cause, supra
note 2. How much weight should a court put on B.B.’s statement that M.L. aimed the gun at the
restaurant before shooting? See id. What about M.L.’s statement that he was shooting at rival
gang members, which seems to contradict B.B.’s statement? See id. Courts can certainly answer
these questions; the real issue is whether they should have to answer them, and whether
requiring them to do so is a wise use of judicial resources.
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not impossible, for judges to analyze some statutes under the Court’s
165
existing ACCA jurisprudence.
In short, all of the proposed solutions to the problems caused by
the ACCA’s residual clause suffer from the same flaw: they rely on a
third party—either Congress or the Court—to resolve the issue.
166
Neither is likely to do so. And as this Part has discussed, many of
the proposed solutions, even if implemented by Congress or the
Court, would not resolve the underlying issues with the residual
clause. This Note next provides lower courts with an interpretation of
the Court’s existing case law that resolves many of the issues
surrounding the residual clause while remaining faithful to the
Court’s opinions.
III. RECONCILING SYKES WITH BEGAY: A NEW UNDERSTANDING
OF THE ACCA’S RESIDUAL CLAUSE
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Sykes, it seems clear that
lower courts no longer need to apply Begay’s “purposeful, violent,
and aggressive” test to crimes with a mens rea of intent or knowledge.
Now, the Begay test applies only to strict-liability crimes and crimes
167
with a mens rea of negligence or recklessness. The Court’s abrupt
change in tack has created a host of new problems, which this Note
attempts to resolve.

165. For an example of a problematic statute, consider the Massachusetts statute at issue in
United States v. Holloway, which “encompasses three types of battery: (1) harmful battery; (2)
offensive battery; and (3) reckless battery.” United States v. Holloway, 630 F.3d 252, 257 (1st
Cir. 2011) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13A (2002)).
166. Congress’s inaction in regards to the residual clause is discussed in this Part of the
Note. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. As for the Court, though Justice Scalia
quipped in his dissent in Sykes that “[w]e try to include an ACCA residual-clause case in about
every second or third volume of the United States Reports,” see Sykes v. United States, 131 S.
Ct. 2267, 2284 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting), the Court has been reluctant to provide broad,
generally applicable language to guide the lower courts. Rather, its decisions are often limited to
the particular predicate offense in any given case—in Begay, for instance, the Court limited its
holding to “the particular statutory provision before [it],” Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137,
148 (2008)—and any broader application of the principles embodied in the Court’s opinions is
due to the lower courts’ interpretations of those cases. For circuit courts’ interpretations of
Begay, see supra note 94.
167. See supra Part I.C. Of course, a minority of circuit courts continue to apply Begay’s
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test to specific intent crimes. See supra note 120 and
accompanying text. This interpretation seems in conflict with Sykes, however. See Sykes, 131 S.
Ct. at 2276 (“Begay involved a crime akin to strict liability, negligence, and recklessness crimes;
and the purposeful, violent, and aggressive formulation was used in that case to explain the
result.”).
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After Sykes, it is unclear how exactly the Begay test should be
applied to crimes with a lesser mens rea. Before the Court decided
Sykes, it was logical for the lower courts to assume that the
purposeful prong barred crimes with no mens rea, and crimes with
mens rea requirements of negligence or recklessness, from qualifying
168
as predicate felonies under the residual clause. Once the Court
limited the Begay test to crimes with a lesser mens rea, however, the
lower courts’ prior interpretations of Begay became more
problematic. If the purposeful prong categorically bars these lesser
169
mens rea crimes, as most circuit courts thought it did pre-Sykes,
then the Court’s decision to apply the Begay test to these crimes is
indefensible. The Court should have stated that the Begay test bars
crimes with a reckless or negligent mens rea, or strict-liability crimes,
from qualifying as violent felonies under the ACCA if it meant for
the circuit courts’ pre-Sykes interpretation to hold.
The Court can, and should, resolve this issue. But until it does,
the existing Court case law can be used to create a workable test for
lesser mens rea crimes that are otherwise eligible for violent-felony
status under the residual clause. Currently, the Court uses the closest
analog among the enumerated offenses as a baseline for comparing
degrees of risk. By slightly extending the use of the closest-analog test
within the ACCA framework to include “in kind” comparisons,
however, courts can have a principled means of distinguishing
between lesser mens rea crimes that should and should not qualify as
violent felonies under the residual clause.
Courts could thus use the closest analog as a baseline for
comparisons in kind, in addition to comparisons of the degree of risk
170
posed. Instead of determining whether a predicate offense is
sufficiently similar in kind to the enumerated offenses as a group—
that is, instead of determining whether the offense is “purposeful,
violent, and aggressive”—courts would determine whether the
offense is sufficiently similar in kind to its closest analog among the
171
enumerated offenses. The inquiry under this new test would
proceed as follows: First, is the predicate offense sufficiently

168. See supra Part I.B.2.
169. See supra note 94.
170. Of course, a crime must still be sufficiently risky to qualify as a violent felony,
particularly in light of Sykes, and nothing in this Part purports to alter the risk analysis.
171. Courts must already determine the closest analog for purposes of the risk analysis, so at
least in this respect, the proposed test would put no undue burden on them.
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purposeful, in the way that its closest analog is purposeful? Second, is
the predicate offense sufficiently violent, in the way that its closest
analog is violent? And third, is the predicate offense sufficiently
aggressive, in the way that its closest analog is aggressive?
This Part contains four sections. Part III.A selects and examines
arson as the closest analog to the lesser mens rea crimes among the
enumerated offenses. The sections that follow use drive-by shooting
172
as defined by Washington law as a hypothetical predicate felony to
conduct the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” analysis with arson
173
as the closest analog. Part III.B compares drive-by shooting to arson
in terms of purposefulness. Part III.C compares drive-by shooting to
arson in terms of violence. Finally, Part III.D compares drive-by
shooting to arson in terms of aggression.
A. Arson as an Analogous Enumerated Offense
Arson is the enumerated offense best suited to act as the closest
analog for crimes with a reckless mens rea. As Justice Scalia noted in
his Begay concurrence, not all of the enumerated offenses require
intent; crimes involving the use of explosives may require only a
reckless mens rea (or even a negligent mens rea or strict liability),
which is seemingly at odds with the “purposeful, violent, and
174
aggressive” test that the majority set forth in that opinion. The same
is arguably true of arson. First- and second-degree arson statutes tend
to involve a reckless mens rea in some capacity, and lesser degrees of
arson with a purely reckless mens rea may still be punishable by over
175
a year in prison as required by § 924(e)(2)(B). Thus, either arson or
crimes involving the use of explosives could serve as the closest

172. Washington’s law is used as the hypothetical predicate felony in keeping with this
Note’s use of M.L., whose crimes were committed in Washington, as an example of a potential
armed career criminal.
173. Drive-by shooting is used here as an example, but the test proposed by this Note would
bring a number of other reckless crimes within the ambit of § 924(e). See infra Part IV.
174. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 152 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“And what
is more, the Court’s posited purpose is positively contradicted by the fact that one of the
enumerated crimes—the unlawful use of explosives—may involve merely negligent or reckless
conduct.”).
175. For an example of a felony arson statute requiring only a reckless mens rea, see N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-17-5(G) (Supp. 2013) (describing “[n]egligent arson” as “recklessly starting a
fire or causing an explosion . . . and thereby directly: (1) causing the death or bodily injury of
another person; or (2) damaging or destroying a building or occupied structure of another
person”). “Negligent arson” in New Mexico is a fourth degree felony, id. § 30-17-5(H), for
which the basic sentence is eighteen months, id. § 31-18-15(A)(10) (2010).
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analog for purposes of this Note. Because crimes involving the use of
176
explosives are relatively unique, arson is the best candidate for a
closest analog to reckless crimes.
First, under Taylor, it is necessary to determine what constitutes
“generic” arson by looking at how the offense is defined in the
177
majority of state criminal codes. The Court has considered majority
178
179
state practice, the Model Penal Code (MPC), and reputable
180
secondary sources when making this determination. The Supreme
181
Court has treated majority state practice as the definitive factor,
however, and this Note does the same, though the MPC is also briefly
discussed.
The majority of states’ first- and second-degree arson statutes
require intent or knowledge as to the act and a reckless mens rea as to
182
183
184
the result, either explicitly or implicitly, though a substantial

176. For example, crimes involving the use of explosives may be associated with terrorism in
ways that the other enumerated offenses are not, due to their potential to cause massive
casualties in ways the others cannot.
177. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990) (performing a similar assessment
for the enumerated offense of burglary).
178. See id. (“We believe that Congress meant by ‘burglary’ the generic sense in which the
term is now used in the criminal codes of most States.”).
179. See id. at 598 n.8 (citing the MPC definition of “burglary”).
180. See id. at 598 (citing 2 WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW 466 (1986)).
181. See id.
182. Twenty-nine states’ first- or second-degree arson statutes implicate a reckless (or
negligent) mens rea. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 708-8252(1) (LexisNexis 2007) (“A
person commits the offense of arson in the second degree if the person intentionally or
knowingly sets fire to or causes to be burned property and . . . [r]ecklessly places another person
in danger of death or bodily injury . . . .”); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-7-41(a) (LexisNexis 2005)
(first-degree arson); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.400(a) (2012) (first-degree arson); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1701, -1704 (2010) (arson); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-38-301(a)(1)(C) (2006)
(arson with negligent risk of death or serious injury); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-111(a)(1)
(West 2012) (first-degree arson); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 803(2) (2007) (first-degree arson);
FLA. STAT. § 806.01(1)(c) (West 2007) (first-degree arson); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-7-60(a)(5)
(2011) (first-degree arson); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-802(3) (2004) (first-degree arson); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/20-1.1(a)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2013) (aggravated arson); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 712.1–2 (West 2013) (first-degree arson); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 513.020(1)(a) (West
2006) (first-degree arson); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:51 (2007) (aggravated arson); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 17-A, § 802(1)(B)(2) (2006) (arson); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.561(2) (West 2009)
(first-degree arson); MO. ANN. STAT. § 569.040.1(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2013) (aggravated
arson); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-502(1) (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2012) (first-degree arson);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634:1(I), (III)(b) (LexisNexis 2007) (arson); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:171(b)(1) (West 2005) (arson); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.15 (McKinney 2009) (second-degree
arson); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21-02 (2012) (endangering by fire or explosion); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2909.02(A)(1) (West 2006) (aggravated arson); OR. REV. STAT.
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185

minority requires only an intentional or knowing act. Hawaii’s
second-degree arson statute is a good example of the majority model:
(1) A person commits the offense of arson in the second degree if
the person intentionally or knowingly sets fire to or causes to be
burned property and:
(a) Recklessly places another person in danger of death or
bodily injury; or
(b) Knowingly or recklessly damages the property of another,
without the other’s consent, in an amount exceeding $1,500.
186
(2) Arson in the second degree is a class B felony.

§ 164.325(1)(a)(B) (2011) (first-degree arson); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3301(a)(1)(i) (2000)
(arson); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-4-2 (2002) (first-degree arson); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 28.02(a)(2)(F) (West 2011) (arson); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.48.020(1)(a) (West 2009)
(first-degree arson); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-101(c) (2013) (aggravated arson). Though not
counted in this category, at least one state has a felony arson provision similar, in terms of mens
rea, to those discussed in this Note, but is not first- or second-degree arson, which is what this
Note examines. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-33-9.3(1) (2006) (“Any person who intentionally
starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his or her own property or another’s, and
thereby recklessly . . . [p]laces another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury . . . is
guilty of reckless burning or exploding. Reckless burning or exploding is a Class 4 felony.”).
183. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 164.325(1) (“A person commits the crime of arson in the
first degree if . . . [b]y starting a fire or causing an explosion, the person intentionally
damages . . . [a]ny property, whether the property of the person or the property of another
person, and such act recklessly places another person in danger of physical injury or protected
property of another in danger of damage . . . .”).
184. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1701, -1704 (criminalizing knowing arson of an
occupied structure in § 13-1704, in which “occupied structure” is defined in § 13-1701 based on
the likelihood of people being near or inside the structure).
185. The other twenty-one states have first- or second-degree arson statutes that require
only an intentional or knowing act. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6-102(a)
(LexisNexis 2012) (“A person may not willfully and maliciously set fire to or burn . . . a
dwelling; or . . . a structure in or on which an individual who is not a participant is present.”); see
also CAL. PENAL CODE § 451 (West 2010) (arson); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-102(1) (2013)
(first-degree arson); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-1-1(a) (LexisNexis 2009) (arson); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 21-5812(a)(1), (b)(1) (Supp. 2012) (arson, aggravated arson); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
266, § 1 (LexisNexis 2010) (burning dwelling houses); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.72 (West
2004 & Supp. 2013) (first-degree arson); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-17-1(1) (2006) (first-degree
arson); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-103(1) (2011) (arson); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.010
(LexisNexis 2012) (first-degree arson); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-17-5(A)(1) (Supp. 2013) (arson);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-58 (2011) (arson); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1401 (West 2002) (firstdegree arson); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-110(B) (2001) (second-degree arson); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-33-9.1 (2006) (first-degree arson); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-301(a) (2010) (arson);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-103 (2012) (aggravated arson); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 502 (2009)
(first-degree arson); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-77(A) (2009) (burning dwelling house); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 61-3-1(a) (LexisNexis 2010) (first-degree arson); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.02(1)(a)
(West 2005) (arson of buildings).
186. HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-8252.
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Hawaii’s second-degree arson offense is an example of the
state majority version of generic arson: intent or knowledge as to the
precipitating act—setting the fire—and recklessness as to the risk of
danger to others. It can thus be considered a “generic” arson statute
for purposes of this Note.
The MPC, the second source mentioned in Taylor, has provisions
that are similar to the state majority and minority models. It does not
188
assign degrees to its arson offenses. MPC sections 220.1(1) and
220.1(2) are similar to the state minority and majority models,
respectively. MPC section 220.1(2), which is similar to the state
majority model, provides:
(2) Reckless Burning or Exploding. A person commits a felony of
the third degree if he purposely starts a fire or causes an explosion,
whether on his own property or another’s, and thereby recklessly:
(a) places another person in danger of death or bodily injury; or
(b) places a building or occupied structure of another in danger
189
of damage or destruction.

Like the state majority model, MPC section 220.1(2) requires
intent or knowledge as to the precipitating act—“start[ing] a fire or
caus[ing] an explosion”—but only recklessness as to the risk of
danger to others.
Thus, it seems firmly established that the majority-model arson
statute, which features such a dual mens rea requirement and is most
similar to crimes like drive-by shooting, qualifies as a generic arson
statute. With this in mind, the next three Sections apply the “in kind”
test to drive-by shooting using, as its closest analog, arson with a dual
mens rea requirement.

187. Alaska’s state code serves as an example of a similar arson provision in the first degree.
See ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.400(a) (“A person commits the crime of arson in the first degree if
the person intentionally damages any property by starting a fire or causing an explosion and by
that act recklessly places another person in danger of serious physical injury.”). The difference
between the two is that Hawaii’s statute is satisfied by intent or knowledge as to the
precipitating act, whereas Alaska’s requires intent.
188. Section 220.1(1) is similar to the state minority model, and provides that a person is
guilty of arson, a second-degree felony, when “he starts a fire or causes an explosion with the
purpose of: (a) destroying a building or occupied structure of another; or (b) destroying or
damaging any property, whether his own or another’s, to collect insurance for such loss.”
MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) (1985).
189. Id. § 220.1(2).
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B. Drive-By Shooting Is Similarly Purposeful to Arson
Under the regime proposed by this Note, the drive-by-shooting
190
offense must be purposeful like its closest analog among the
enumerated offenses, arson. Like setting a fire, shooting a gun
involves a calculated, intentional act that often entails a subsidiary
mens rea regarding the risk to others associated with the intentional
act. The “reckless[] discharge[] [of] a firearm . . . in a manner which
creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another
191
person,” therefore, seems sufficiently purposeful when compared to
its closest analog among the enumerated offenses, arson.
192
United States v. Alexander, an Eleventh Circuit decision postBegay but pre-Sykes, shows how a reckless crime may still be
sufficiently purposeful under Begay. The Court in Alexander analyzed
a Florida statute criminalizing the willful discharge of a firearm from
a vehicle under the Sentencing Guideline’s crime-of-violence
193
provision. The Eleventh Circuit determined that violation of the
Florida statute required deliberate discharge of a weapon from a
vehicle when another person was within one-thousand feet of the
shooter, although the weapon did not need to be aimed at that
194
person. Under these circumstances, “there is a strong chance that,
195
intentionally or not, some other person will be struck by a bullet,”
and the court held that the crime was sufficiently “purposeful, violent,
and aggressive” to qualify as a violent felony under the residual
196
clause.
The shooter’s conduct—firing a weapon under

190. Parts III.B, III.C, and III.D use Washington’s drive-by-shooting statute as a template.
The statute and its application to one criminal in particular are discussed in the Introduction.
See supra notes 20–27 and accompanying text.
191. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.045(1) (West 2009).
192. United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2010).
193. Id. at 1256.
194. Id. The Eleventh Circuit relied on the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
relevant statute: “[T]he Florida Supreme Court has stated that shooting from a vehicle in
violation of section 790.15(2) requires proof of two elements: (1) the defendant knowingly and
willfully discharged a firearm from a vehicle; and (2) the discharge occurred within 1,000 feet of
any person.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
195. Id. at 1257.
196. Id. at 1258–59. Though the Eleventh Circuit’s decision was made relatively simple, as
far as the purposefulness prong goes, because Florida state courts read a knowing or willful
discharge requirement into the statute, see supra note 194 and accompanying text, it still serves
as an example of the way in which courts could analyze crimes like drive-by shooting that
involve the intentional or knowing discharge of a firearm with recklessness as to the results.
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circumstances in which a person could easily be hit—was impliedly
reckless, but the action itself—the firing of the gun—was deliberate.
Thus, crimes like drive-by shooting should be sufficiently
“purposeful” to qualify as violent felonies under the residual clause.
Such a flexible understanding of “purposeful” may cause lower courts
to fear that a host of reckless crimes will qualify under this
interpretation of the purposeful prong of the Begay test. However,
there are further limits on which crimes can qualify as violent
felonies: in addition to being purposeful, the crime must also be
197
198
sufficiently violent and aggressive to qualify as a violent felony
under the residual clause.
C. Drive-By Shooting Is Just As Violent as, if Not More Violent than,
Arson
Second, drive-by shooting under Washington law must be
sufficiently similar in terms of violence to its closest analog among the
enumerated offenses, arson. Although courts have rarely addressed
what makes a crime sufficiently violent under Begay, there is at least
199
one decision on point. In United States v. Woods, the Seventh
Circuit equated the violence prong of Begay with an inquiry into
200
risk. Woods treated risk of physical injury to another as a proxy for
violence. Though this exercise may be redundant with a court’s
general inquiry into risk, it seems appropriate in light of the renewed
emphasis the Supreme Court has placed on risk after Sykes. The
question, then, is whether drive-by shooting is roughly as risky as its
closest analog among the enumerated offenses, arson.
Arson itself is not particularly risky, and the risk caused by driveby shooting is almost certainly comparable. Although arson can be
devastating to individual property owners, arson itself is not
particularly risky in terms of human casualties. As Justice Thomas
noted in his Sykes concurrence, “[T]he injury rate for burglary and
arson is around 3 injuries per 100 crimes, or less,” whereas for vehicle
pursuits, for example, the “injury rate is just over 4 injuries per 100

197. See infra Part III.C.
198. See infra Part III.D.
199. United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2009).
200. See id. at 407–08 (“The Supreme Court [has] recently addressed the issue of violence,
for these [ACCA] purposes. As it had already noted in James, the offense must in the ordinary
run of cases describe behavior that poses a sufficiently great risk of physical injury to another
before it will satisfy the ACCA or § 4B1.1.”).
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201

chases, excluding injuries to the perpetrator.” Justice Thomas relied
on these statistics to reach his conclusion that in the ordinary case,
intentional flight in a vehicle may be riskier than arson and
202
burglary.
Similarly, drive-by shooting is much riskier (and thus more
violent) than arson in the ordinary case. The Eleventh Circuit’s
203
decision in Alexander, came to the conclusion that discharging a
firearm in a public place was sufficiently risky based on an intuitive
204
analysis of the conduct underlying the statute:
The firing of a weapon poses a risk that a bystander will be
injured by a stray bullet. The range of even a small handgun exceeds
the range of sight of the person firing the gun. . . . [T]here is a risk
that the bullet will stray from its target and injure another person.
This risk increases substantially when the firearm is discharged from
a vehicle. Not only is the shooter’s range of vision diminished, but
vehicles are commonly located on roads and parking areas, which
are often adjacent to inhabited buildings and populated by drivers of
205
other vehicles, their passengers, and pedestrians.

Thus, drive-by shooting is sufficiently risky, or violent, to qualify as a
violent felony under the test used in Begay.
D. Drive-by Shooting Is Similarly Aggressive to Arson
Third, drive-by shooting must be aggressive, just as arson, its
closest analog among the enumerated offenses, is aggressive. Lower
courts have assumed that the aggressiveness prong refers to the
defendant’s underlying motive or mental state: in United States v.
206
Templeton,
for example, the Seventh Circuit found the
aggressiveness prong unsatisfied, because “[a]lthough the [walkaway
escape] statute does require intent, the required mental state is only
intent to be free of custody, not intent to injure or threaten
207
anyone.” Put differently, “Aggressive, violent acts are ‘aimed at

201. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2280 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
202. Id.
203. For discussion of Alexander, see supra Part III.B.
204. As discussed above, statistical evidence may be useful in determining whether a crime
is sufficiently risky, but it is not required. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
205. United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011).
206. United States v. Templeton, 543 F.3d 378 (7th Cir. 2008).
207. Id. at 383.

GORDON IN PRINTER PROOF CLEAN VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

12/3/2013 3:48 PM

992

[Vol. 63:955

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

other persons or property where persons might be located and
208
thereby injured,’” and “‘[t]hey involve overt, active conduct that
209
results in harm to a person or property.’”
Arson—drive-by shooting’s closest analog among the
enumerated offenses—is sufficiently aggressive, though most likely
less aggressive than drive-by shooting. It is difficult to characterize
the intent of a typical arsonist, and the arsonist need not intend to
210
injure anyone. Nonetheless, arson is typically directed at property
211
where people are likely to be, and first- and second-degree arson, as
discussed in Part III.A, would always seem to “involve overt, active
212
conduct that results in harm to a person or property.”
Drive-by shooting meets all the same criteria as arson, and more.
Although one could argue that a drive-by-shooting offender may not
213
intend “to injure or threaten anyone” in the commission of the
crime, this is typically an offender’s intent. By the terms of the
214
statute, it seems apparent that drive-by shooting must be “aimed at
other persons or property where persons might be located and
215
thereby injured” in the ordinary case, or else it is unlikely it would
cause the requisite “serious potential risk of physical injury to
216
another.” It follows that drive-by shooting is sufficiently aggressive.
Thus, under the new test, drive-by shooting would qualify as a
violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause because it is
sufficiently “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” in the same way that
its closest analog among the enumerated offenses, arson, is
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive.”

208. United States v. Vanhook, 640 F.3d 706, 714 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.
Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2008)).
209. Id. at 714–15 (quoting United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2009)).
210. It seems equally likely that an arsonist might intend to damage property, either for his
own sake or in an attempt to defraud insurers, and many state codes anticipate as much. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-104(1) (2013) (“A person who, by means of fire or explosives,
intentionally damages any property with intent to defraud commits third degree arson.”).
211. For a more detailed discussion of arson provisions, see supra Part III.A.
212. Polk, 577 F.3d at 519.
213. United States v. Templeton, 543 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2008).
214. Washington’s statute states that “[a] person is guilty of drive-by shooting when he or
she recklessly discharges a firearm . . . in a manner which creates a substantial risk of death or
serious physical injury to another person.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.045(1) (West
2009).
215. United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2008).
216. Polk, 577 F.3d at 519.
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IV. APPLYING A REVISED SYKES–BEGAY FRAMEWORK
This Part discusses the application of the new regime to example
statutes drawn directly from the cases discussed in this Note. Some
problematic statutes would be brought within the scope of the
residual clause by applying the “in kind” comparison to a predicate
felony’s closest analog among the enumerated offenses, whereas
others would remain outside its scope consistent with the Supreme
Court’s ACCA jurisprudence. Part IV.A discusses examples of
statutes that would be brought within the scope of the residual clause,
and Part IV.B discusses examples of those predicate felonies that
would remain outside its ambit.
A. Problematic Statutes That the New Regime Would Bring Within
the Scope of the Residual Clause
The regime proposed by this Note would have the largest effect
on gun crimes. For the reasons discussed in Part III, all crimes
involving the reckless discharge of a gun would be sufficiently
purposeful, which would significantly expand the range of qualifying
217
predicate offenses in this category. This is entirely in accord with
the purpose of § 924(e), which was passed to deter armed career
218
criminals.
For offenses involving other types of weapons or dangerous
conduct, it may be unclear whether the purposefulness requirement is
satisfied. Consider the involuntary-manslaughter statute at issue in
219
220
Woods or the reckless-endangerment statute from Gray. Courts
would need to use state case law and the modified categorical
approach to determine whether these crimes are sufficiently
purposeful and aggressive. As courts already employ these methods
217. Of course, these crimes would still need to satisfy the violence and aggressiveness
requirements.
218. See supra notes 28–46 and accompanying text.
219. See United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing the
defendant’s conviction for violation of Illinois’s involuntary manslaughter statute); see also 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3 (Supp. 2013) (“A person who unintentionally kills an individual without
lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful
which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some
individual, and he performs them recklessly . . . .”).
220. See United States v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing the defendant’s
conviction for violation of New York’s reckless endangerment statute); see also N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 2009) (“A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first
degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person.”).
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to clarify vague statutes, however, the proposed test would not
impose a significant additional burden on courts.
B. Statutes That Would Remain Outside the Scope of the Residual
Clause Under the New Regime, Consistent with the Supreme
Court’s ACCA Jurisprudence
The proposed regime comports with the Supreme Court’s
ACCA jurisprudence by excluding from the clause’s scope statutes
that the Court has rejected as candidates for violent-felony status. For
example, neither DUI statutes nor the reckless and negligent crimes
cited in Begay as examples of potential violent felonies would qualify
under the new regime. Finally, some gun crimes would still fail to
qualify. Each of these examples is analyzed in turn.
First, DUI offenses—the impetus behind the Court’s decision in
Begay—would still fail to qualify as violent felonies under the test
221
proposed by this Note. The New Mexico statute at issue in Begay
made it “unlawful for a person who is under the influence of
222
intoxicating liquor to drive a vehicle within this state.” Though the
223
offense is sufficiently violent, it is neither sufficiently purposeful nor
aggressive. Its closest analog, arson, generally requires a reckless
mens rea at minimum, and the New Mexico statute, applying the
categorical approach, appears to be a strict-liability offense. Although
arson is sufficiently aggressive because it is typically aimed at places
where people are usually located, DUI is not “aimed” in any sense of
224
the word.

221. In Begay, the Court assumed that DUI offenses were sufficiently risky. See Begay v.
United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008) (“[W]e assume that the lower courts were right in
concluding that DUI involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.” (quotation marks omitted)). This Note assumes the same.
222. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(A) (2004).
223. Violence is measured by risk under the regime proposed by this Note, an approach that
the Court found sufficient in Begay. See supra notes 200–05.
224. New Mexico’s aggravated-DUI offense would also fail to qualify as a violent felony.
The statute states that “[a]ggravated driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs
consists of . . . causing bodily injury to a human being as a result of the unlawful operation of a
motor vehicle while driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.” N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 66-8-102(D) (Supp. 2013). The statute founders on the purposefulness prong, of course,
but it also fails under the aggressiveness prong. Though a person has been injured by definition,
a DUI offender’s conduct still cannot be “aimed” at the victim.
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Second, the crimes cited by Begay—negligent and reckless
226
227
polluting, reckless tampering with consumer products, and the
228
negligence of seamen —as examples of potential, but unsuitable,
candidates for violent-felony status if reckless or negligent crimes
were included under the statute, would remain outside the scope of
229
the residual clause under the regime proposed by this Note. The
negligent crimes (negligent polluting and negligent seamanship)
230
would not be sufficiently purposeful. The reckless crimes are more
difficult, though reckless polluting is unlikely to qualify as violent or
231
aggressive, and may not be sufficiently purposeful either. It is
possible to imagine scenarios in which a reckless polluter could meet
these criteria, but under the categorical approach, “the proper inquiry
is whether the conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense,
232
in the ordinary case,” is sufficient.
Reckless tampering with consumer products would also fail,
though it comes the closest to qualifying under the new regime.
Tampering as described in the statute appears to be an intentional

225. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B) (2006) (“Any person who . . . negligently introduces into
a sewer system or into a publicly owned treatment works any pollutant or hazardous substance
which such person knew or reasonably should have known could cause personal injury or
property damage . . . shall be punished . . . .”).
226. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-4-103(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for a person
to . . . recklessly cause pollution of the waters or air of the state in a manner not otherwise
permitted by law and thereby create a substantial likelihood of adversely affecting human
health, animal or plant life, or property.”).
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (“Whoever, with reckless disregard for the risk that another
person will be placed in danger of death or bodily injury and under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to such risk, tampers with any consumer product that affects interstate or
foreign commerce, or the labeling of, or container for, any such product, or attempts to do so,
shall [be guilty of a crime].”).
228. See 18 U.S.C. § 1115 (“Every captain, engineer, pilot, or other person employed on any
steamboat or vessel, by whose misconduct, negligence, or inattention to his duties on such vessel
the life of any person is destroyed, and every owner, charterer, inspector, or other public officer,
through whose fraud, neglect, connivance, misconduct, or violation of law the life of any person
is destroyed, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.”).
229. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146–47 (2008).
230. Although an argument could potentially be made for the inclusion of negligent offenses
under the residual clause, this Note does not go so far. For a discussion of the purposefulness
requirement and this Note’s interpretation of it, see supra Parts III.A–B.
231. It is unclear from the face of Arkansas’s reckless-pollution statute whether the
pollution itself must be intentional. Based solely on the statutory language, it seems that an
egregious accident or mistake could theoretically qualify.
232. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007) (emphasis added).
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act, so the reckless component presumably applies to the results of
the act and not to the act itself, as with arson and drive-by-shooting
offenses. It may be sufficiently violent, depending on the
circumstances, but it is insufficiently aggressive. There is no reason to
suspect from the text of the statute that the offender has “aimed” any
injury at a person or a place where a person is located. As with
reckless pollution, it is always possible to imagine an egregious
violation that could arguably qualify, but the categorical approach
234
focuses on violations in the ordinary case.
Finally, though the regime proposed by this Note would allow
more gun crimes to qualify as violent felonies, some gun crimes would
still fail to qualify. For example, the statute at issue in United States v.
235
Coronado stated that “any person who willfully discharges a firearm
in a grossly negligent manner which could result in injury or death to
236
a person is guilty of a public offense.” Gross negligence is not
sufficiently purposeful when comparing the offense to its closest
analog, arson, and this offense would fail to qualify as a violent
felony.
CONCLUSION
After Sykes was decided, the Eleventh Circuit declared that “the
237
ever-shifting sands of the residual clause [have] shifted again.” The
residual clause has always posed problems for the lower courts, but
interpreting the provision has become increasingly difficult in light of
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sykes and Begay. Courts have relied
on Begay’s “purposeful” component to exclude crimes with a reckless
mens rea, which contravenes congressional intent. Congress’s primary
238
concern has been the potential for harm to persons, and it defies
logic to think that Congress would have wanted dangerous crimes like
drive-by shooting to fall outside the scope of the residual clause.
The new regime proposed by this Note realizes both Congress’s
intent and the Court’s existing ACCA jurisprudence. By applying
233. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. The parts of the statute that discuss reckless
behavior are governed by the prepositional phrase “with,” and the clause itself is closed off by a
comma before the offensive act (tampering) is described. Presumably, then, the tampering in
the statute is not reckless but intentional.
234. See supra note 232.
235. United States v. Coronado, 603 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2010).
236. CAL. PENAL CODE § 246.3(a) (West 2008).
237. United States v. Chitwood, 676 F.3d 971, 978 (11th Cir. 2012).
238. See supra notes 23–40 and accompanying text.
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Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test to reckless felonies
using the felonies’ closest analogs among the enumerated offenses as
baselines, courts can allow a limited number of reckless crimes to
qualify while still respecting the boundaries set by the Court in Sykes.
In doing so, courts can better satisfy the ACCA’s purpose: increased,
though narrow, targeting of the most dangerous felons—individuals
like M.L.—the armed career criminals.

